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A B S T R A C T
Over the past decade, Australia has been buying water entitlements and subsidising irrigation infrastructure to
reallocate water from consumptive to environmental purposes in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB). There is
considerable evidence that irrigation infrastructure subsidies are not cost-effective, as well as questions as to
whether water extractions are increasing (rebounding) as a result. We used 2481 on-farm MDB irrigation surveys
and identified a ‘rebound effect’ on water extractions, with irrigators who received an irrigation infrastructure
subsidy significantly increasing (21-28%) their water extraction, relative to those who did not receive any
grants. Although the precise hydrological impact of this rebound effect on catchment and Basin-wide extractions
remains unknown, publicly available water data suggest that reductions in extractions from the MDB – sup-
posedly commensurate with increases in environmental flows – may have been overestimated, particularly in the
Northern MDB. This overestimation may in turn be linked to issues with water measurement and extractions at
the catchment and Basin-scale, which occur due to: (1) water theft and poor enforcement; (2) inaccurate or
absent water metering; (3) growth in unlicensed surface and groundwater extractions and on-farm storage ca-
pacity; (4) legal and practical uncertainties in compliance tools, processes and water accounting; and (5)
complexity of floodplain, evaporation and groundwater interactions. To respond to these water governance
challenges, MDB water and rural policy actions must: (1) improve measurement of diversions and develop
transparent and robust water accounting, independently audited and accounting for uncertainty; (2) improve
compliance, fines and regulation; (3) use multiple lines of evidence for water accounting and compliance; and
(4) prioritise the cost and environmental effectiveness of water recovery.
1. Introduction
Addressing the world's growing freshwater demand within the
context of finite supply and climate change is one of the most sig-
nificant challenges facing humanity (Grafton et al., 2018). Irrigated
agriculture is the largest user of water globally. As such, an improved
proportion of water consumed in beneficial crop evapo-transpiration,
relative to the water extracted or applied to crops – or a greater ‘crop
per drop’ – is required. Increased irrigation efficiency – which is sub-
sidised and promoted by governments around the world – is supposed
to accomplish this goal by moving from inefficient irrigation methods,
such as surface irrigation, towards more controlled systems, such as
drip irrigation. This can afford opportunities to reallocate ‘water sav-
ings’ to other uses, such as urban consumption and the environment
(Perry et al., 2017). While modernising irrigation infrastructure can
provide private farm benefits, with improved crop yields, nutrient de-
livery and reduced labour costs (Meyer, 2005; Loch and
Adamson, 2015), it does not necessarily generate basin-scale water
savings. This is in part due to a phenomenon known as the ‘rebound
effect’ (Gómez and Pérez-Blanco, 2014; Perry et al., 2017). Put simply,
the rebound effect on water use occurs when increased water demand
from improved water productivity outweighs technical efficiency sav-
ings, resulting in increased extractions.
The rebound effect is examined through the lens of water policy and
management in Australia's food and fibre bowl, the Murray-Darling
Basin (MDB or Basin). This Basin was chosen because, first, Australia
has invested approximately $AUDS4 billion of public money in the
modernisation of irrigation infrastructure in the MDB as part of a policy
to return water to the environment without compromising agricultural
productivity (DAWR, 2019a). Second, it is commonly assumed that an
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overall Basin-wide limit on water extractions, known as ‘the Cap’,
prevents increases in Basin-scale water extractions or water consump-
tion. This is because gross water extractions from watercourses and
regulated rivers were set at 1993–94 levels of development (except
Queensland, set at 1999-2000 levels and South Australia where the Cap
was set at an average use of 90% of entitlements) (MDBA, 2018;
AAS, 2019). Third, the Basin has been a leader in the development of
demand-management economic incentives such as water markets
(Quiggin, 2008; Seidl et al., 2020a).
With the passage of the Water Act in 2007 and its delegated in-
strument, the MDB Plan in 2012, the Cap was replaced with Sustainable
Diversion Limits (SDLs) for each surface and groundwater resource in
the Basin. The Act and MDB Plan were a direct response to the over-
allocation of surface-water, with more than half the flows in many
rivers in the MDB being diverted (end of system measure)
(CSIRO, 2008). Under the original Basin Plan, 2750 billions of litres
(gigalitres-GL) in long-term average annual yield (LTAAY)1 was to be
returned to the environment, with an additional 450GL, to be ex-
clusively acquired through on and off-farm infrastructure upgrades,
agreed to between Basin governments on the basis that it would not
have a negative impact on rural productivity (Grafton and Wheeler,
2018). In 2018, legislative amendments reduced entitlement recovery
to 2680GL; this figure was revised down by a further 605GL (subject to
the implementation of 36 ‘supply measure’ projects that are meant to
offset water in exchange for ‘equivalent environmental outcomes’)
(PC, 2018; Grafton, 2019).
The first iteration of water recovery by the federal government
commenced before the MDB Plan was legislated and was provided for
under the auspices of theWater for the Future program, a national water
management agreement by federal and state governments. Under this
program, two mechanisms were developed to remove water from the
consumptive pool and return it to the environment; both have con-
tinued under the Basin Plan. The first, ‘buybacks’, involves the direct
purchase of water entitlements from willing irrigators at market prices
through open tender. Buying through open tender effectively ceased in
2013, with the focus shifting to ‘strategic purchases’ via closed nego-
tiations with large corporate entities (with some limited exceptions).
Some of these purchases have been criticised due to their lack of
transparency, questionable environmental value (owing to the nature of
the entitlements purchased) and potentially inflated values
(Grafton, 2019; Seidl et al., 2020b). The second mechanism, subsidised
irrigation infrastructure upgrades, is enabled through the Sustainable
Rural Water-Use & Infrastructure program (SRWUIP) and associated
schemes. For a subsidy or grant, the beneficiary implements specific
infrastructure works and transfers a share of the assumed water savings
in entitlements to the Australian Government. An additional sub-
category of this mechanism – namely off-farm infrastructure moder-
nisation – may also contribute to assumed water savings for the pur-
poses of the aforementioned 450GL (Grafton and Wheeler, 2018).
Australia is more than halfway through implementation of the MDB
Plan and, as at the start of 2019, has spent AUD$2.5 billion on buybacks
and AUD$3.9 billion on modernising irrigation infrastructure
(DAWR, 2019b). As of 31 March 2019, the Australian Government had
acquired 1227GL of water entitlements through buybacks and strategic
purchases (DAWR, 2019c), along with 695GL under the SRWUIP pro-
gram. Based on these figures, approximately one-fifth of the estimated
consumptive pool of water in the MDB had been transferred to en-
vironmental use under the Act and MDB Plan (see footnote 6 for detail).
Voluntary buybacks of water entitlements remains a controversial
policy, with some rural communities asserting that they have dimin-
ished local spending, employment and public services (Bjornlund et al.,
2011). These claims and persistent lobbying by industry irrigation
groups drove the Australian Government to introduce (in 2015) a
statutory limit of 1500GL on the volume of water that could be acquired
via buybacks. The Australian Government also increased the budget
allocated to irrigation infrastructure upgrades (Grafton and
Wheeler, 2018; Haensch et al., 2019). This policy decision was made
despite strong support for buybacks (Quiggin, 2008; Lee and
Ancev, 2009; Grafton, 2010; Wittwer, 2011; Crase et al., 2013). Fur-
ther, and despite claims to the contrary, many supported buybacks on
the basis that they not only benefited the environment, but provided
irrigators with far greater financial flexiblity than irrigation infra-
structure grants (Loch et al., 2014; Wheeler et al., 2014b).
The two justifications for subsidising irrigation infrastructure for
environmental water recovery purposes include: (1) salinity: reducing
saline return flows into the rivers (water quality issue) (Wang et al.,
2018); and (2) farm productivity: increases farm productivity
(DAWR, 2019a) and hence makes recovery more politically acceptable.
The multiple arguments against irrigation infrastructure subsidies in-
clude: (1) cost: subsidies cost at least three times more per dollars per
megalitre (ML or million litres) of water acquired for the environment
than buyback (Grafton and Wheeler, 2018; DAWR, 2019b), partly be-
cause of the increased transaction costs of subsidy programs; (2) gov-
ernance: the program has been plagued by a lack of transparency, with
some schemes subject to corruption charges
(Victorian Ombudsman, 2011); (3) return flows: reduces seepage into
groundwater and flows to streams and rivers (water quantity issue)
(Williams and Grafton, 2020); (4) rebound effect: increases the area of
land under irrigation or the area of land growing crops, potentially
increasing water extractions (Adamson and Loch, 2018); (5) utilisation:
increases utilisation of water entitlements and allocations
(Wheeler et al., 2014a); (6) substitution: groundwater substituted for
surface-water (Wheeler et al., 2014a); (7) equity: benefits are not evenly
spread, with large corporate entities having a much higher probability
of securing irrigation subsidies (21 times) over family farms2; (8)
floodplain harvesting: the program funds new dams that can increase
floodplain harvesting and divert water that may have been returned to
streams and rivers (ABC Four Corners, 2019; Slattery et al., 2019); and
(9) resilience: encourages substitution to permanent crops, increasing
both electricity costs and demand for water during drought
(Adamson and Loch, 2018; Wheeler et al., 2018) and reduces commu-
nity resilience.3
Our purpose was to investigate whether irrigators who received an
infrastructure subsidy in the MDB sometime in the past decade ex-
tracted more water compared to those who had not received a grant,
holding all other factors constant. A unique farm-level survey database
of 2481 records was used to investigate the potential existence of the
rebound effect of irrigation infrastructure subsidies. We also examined
publicly available data on Basin-wide water extractions from two dif-
ferent sources: the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) and the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), to understand how the rebound
effect and the return of water entitlements from consumptive to en-
vironmental use may be influencing total water extractions.
Our contribution may be summarised as the identification, through
existing datasets, of the intended and unintended consequences of using
1 LTAAY is the long-term annual average volume of water permitted to be
taken for consumptive use under a water access entitlement. Currently, all
LTAAY figures are calculated using the long-term diversion limit equivalent
(LTDLE) factors, with these factors to be accredited in finalised state water
resource plans. See Appendix A for further comment.
2 70% of subsidies for irrigation efficiency were directed to family farms in
the MDB (Simson, 2019), hence corporates (representing 2% of Australian
farms (ABARES (2019; 132)) received 30% of funding: meaning a corporate
farm had a 21 times higher probability of receiving an irrigation grant than a
family farm.
3 However, at least one irrigation infrastructure scheme (e.g. SA River Murray
Sustainability Program) allowed for other (non-irrigation infrastructure) farm
activities to be subsidised that may increase a farm's resilience in the face of
future water scarcity.
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subsidies to increase irrigation efficiency. Our findings are relevant beyond
Australia insofar as many countries are attempting to increase overall water
availability by subsidising and/or modernising irrigation infrastructure
(Perry et al., 2017) – albeit it must be kept in mind that the institutional,
physical, environmental, social and cultural conditions strongly influence
all countries’ water management and governance challenges.
2. Water use efficiency and the rebound effect
Increased irrigation efficiency is often presented as an opportunity for
large-scale water savings, particularly in the agricultural sector.
Perry et al. (2017) defined water use as: (1) consumptive use (conversion
of water into water vapour), comprising beneficial consumption (i.e. crop
transpiration; evaporation from wetlands) and non-beneficial consumption
(i.e. evaporation from water surfaces and wet soil; transpiration by weeds);
(2) non-consumptive use (water that remains in liquid state), comprising
recoverable flows (returning to a river or aquifer for potential reuse) and
non-recoverable flows (flowing to the sea or other unviable sink); and (3)
storage change. Field water efficiency is often defined as the ratio of the
volume of all irrigation water beneficially used on a farmer's field to the
total volume of irrigation water applied; while water productivity is the
output (yield or revenue) produced to water used (either water extracted,
applied or consumed) (Grafton et al., 2018).
Irrigation efficiency programs, widely promoted by many governments
as a panacea to overallocation, can result in contrary outcomes or rebound
effects (Loch and Adamson, 2015). The rebound effect, also known as the
Jevons’ Paradox (Gómez and Pérez-Blanco, 2014), was first identified by
Jevons in 1866 in a seminal study of coal use during the Industrial Re-
volution (Perry et al., 2017), revealing that increases in the work or energy
produced per tonne of coal had increased, not decreased, coal use. The
rebound effect also occurs in energy use (Wei et al., 2019).
The rebound effect is the change (increase) in water extraction from
increased irrigation efficiency and its presence is determined by the in-
teraction of three different water demand effects: (1) a technical shift al-
lowing water extractions to decrease from the adoption of modernised ir-
rigation infrastructure which allow far greater control over water
movements and use (decreasing water demand); (2) a possible variable cost
increase from modernising infrastructure and subsequently increasing
electricity costs from increased pumping – especially if upgrading from
previous flood irrigation by gravity (decreasing water demand); and (3) a
water productivity/relative value increase as modernised infrastructure allows
water to be used in new ways and often means crop mix change, increased
utilisation of under-utilised water assets (including groundwater) and in-
creased irrigation land (therefore increasing water demand). The increase
in water extraction (namely the existence of a rebound effect) from (3) can
outweigh the decreases in water extraction from (1) and (2) when: water is
scarce; there is little idle irrigation capacity; irrigation infrastructures are
subsidised; and water and energy costs are low (Gómez and Pérez-
Blanco, 2014; Perry et al., 2017). The next issue is whether a rebound effect
occurs only within a farm-level, or at a Basin-wide level. Deficiencies in
water measurement, water accounting and compliance processes under-
mine attempts to contain these increases within any designated limit on
catchment and Basin-wide extractions. The following section investigates
the extent to which Australia falls into being a completely capped system
(hence where irrigation water extractions cannot increase at the Basin-wide
level even if there is existence of a rebound effect at the farm-level); or
whether there is evidence of significant deficiences in water measurement
and accounting that signal the potential for increased extractions to occur.
2.1. The Murray-Darling Basin literature
There is considerable literature that has signalled issues with water
measurement and accounting in the Basin. For example, two recent studies
have estimated the reduction in return flows (not currently fully accounted
for in reductions in water inflows in the Basin) associated with sub-
sidisation of MDB irrigation infrastructure. As a result of subsidies,
reductions in return flows have been estimated to be 16% (Wang et al.,
2018) or 40-90% (Williams and Grafton, 2020) of the amount transferred
to environmental entitlements, with each study using different assump-
tions. Other studies have highlighted the possibility of the rebound effect
and return flows in the MDB (e.g. Young et al., 2002; Qureshi et al., 2011;
Grafton, 2017), while Loch and Adamson (2015) suggested that subsidies
for irrigation infrastructure could increase consumptive water extractions
and irrigation area in the Northern MDB.
Schirmer (2017) found that MDB irrigators who received an infra-
structure grant were significantly more likely to increase irrigated and
farm areas; increase irrigation efficiency; purchase new land; intensify
production; experience negative impacts such as increased farm debt
and electricity/power costs from modernisation; and experience a loss
in the last year (and over the previous three years). Most grant re-
cipients (65%) believed that on-farm irrigation upgrades positively
impacted farm profitability, however no information was available on
how their water extractions changed over time (Schirmer, 2017).
ABC Four Corners (2019) and Slattery et al. (2019) suggested at least
20-30 new private dams, some capturing overland flows that previously
flowed into rivers, have been built in the MDB with irrigation infra-
structure subsidies. This finding is important because the common as-
sumption by the Australian Government, the MDBA, state governments
and some water scientists is that through imposing a limit (Cap) on the
volume of water extracted within the MDB, and requiring the trade of
water entitlements to occur within that limit, irrigators cannot increase
water extractions (e.g. see Simson, 2019; Vertessy et al., 2019). In fact,
various legal and illegal factors likely allow increased water extractions to
exceed the statutory limits of the Cap. Factors that can result in increased
water extractions, even within the Cap, include: (1) theft of surface and
groundwater resources; (2) inaccurate or missing measurements of surface
and groundwater extractions (Matthews, 2017; MDBA, 2017;
NSW Ombudsman, 2017; Holley et al., 2018, 2020; Nelson, 2019); (3)
unlicensed extractions such as the interception of overland flows during
floods (AAS, 2019) and unmeasured ‘stock and domestic’ uses of water
(MDBA, 2019a); (4) legal exceptions, water accounting issues and un-
certainties in compliance tools, processes and river modelling; and (5) the
complexity of accounting for water in complex floodplains, with eva-
poration, return flow and groundwater interactions (Kingsford, 1999;
Ren and Kingsford, 2011; MDBA, 2018; AAS, 2019; Holley et al. 2020).
Each of these issues are discussed in further detail in Appendix A,
and here we highlight their potential effect on water extractions. In
particular, while the scale of illegal water extractions is unknown, one
potential very broad indicator may include the New South Wales (NSW)
General Purpose Water Accounting Reports. For example, the report for
the Border Rivers Catchment in the MDB in 2017–18 cited an ‘un-
accounted difference’ of 71,651ML, representing 19% of total catch-
ment inflows (Burrell et al., 2018) – this difference was in addition to
accounted evaporative losses. Other large percentages of ‘unaccounted
difference’ are also found in other MDB catchments, and although
modelling differences are to be expected, it may also highlight other
more serious issues. The MDBA has also estimated actual surface-water
extractions at the Basin-scale under SDL accounting arrangements,
which includes estimates on unreported forms of take (i.e. extraction
from watercourses for activities not previously included under the Cap
– including interception activities, basic rights4 and floodplain har-
vesting). For the 2017-18 irrigation season, actual extractions under
SDL accounting were estimated by the MDBA at 2755.5GL (namely 35%
higher) than that reported under the Cap (MDBA, 2019a; p. 92).
More broadly, ongoing resource limitations, as well as fluctuations
4 MDBA (2019a) describes take under basic rights as water used for stock and
domestic purposes in the MDB as well as native title rights in some Basin states.
While the licencing requirements vary across states, a licence or approval is
generally required to construct a bore for stock and domestic purposes, but not
always to extract water from it.
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in resources for prosecutions, illegal bores and the potential overuse of
stock and domestic water, historically received minimal inspectoral
attention (Matthews 2017; NSWO 2017).
3. Data and method
Two types of data (secondary and primary) were used to investigate
changes in MDB water extractions. We first provide a snapshot of
available secondary data (using two different sources: MDBA for in-
formation on surface-water extractions under two different water ac-
counting frameworks and the ABS for a snapshot of on-farm water ex-
tractions) to understand how water extractions have changed in both
the Southern and Northern Basins (see Fig. 1) since the return of water
entitlements from consumptive to environmental use from 2007-08
onwards. The primary data source uses information from three large-
scale and representative irrigator surveys in the Southern Basin.
3.1. Location
The MDB has 65% of Australia's irrigated land, incorporating the
Murray (South) and Darling (North) regions (Fig. 1). The Southern
Basin comprises irrigation districts in South Australia, NSW and Vic-
toria; while the Northern Basin includes irrigation districts in northern
NSW and southern Queensland. The percentage of agribusinesses that
irrigated in 2017-18 in the Southern Basin was 38% and 13% in the
Northern Basin (ABS, 2019). Irrigators in Southern Basin districts
historically received water allocations, regulated by government, de-
termined by security/reliability restrictions and other factors such as
history of use, environmental conditions and upstream storage
(Wheeler et al., 2014). Irrigators in the Northern Basin own less regu-
lated water entitlements and more unregulated licences; pay less in
water charges; have larger irrigated areas and more homogenous pro-
duction (namely cotton); trade water less; and rely more on ground-
water and off-river storages for water extractions (AAS, 2019;
Wheeler and Garrick, 2020).
3.2. Secondary water extractions data
Our first source of secondary data came from the ABS (multiple years)
water use survey of irrigated farms in the MDB. This survey tracked irri-
gation business numbers, volume of irrigation water extracted per hectare
of irrigated land, land area irrigated and crops grown (ABS, multiple years).
The second source was from the MDBA water audit monitoring, SDL ac-
counting and transitional water take, and Cap register compliance data
(MDBA, 2018, 2019a).
ABS water extraction data for the MDB is presented from 2005-06
onwards, until 2017-18. Water extractions per hectare for the Northern
and Southern Basins (Table B2, Appendix B) were calculated from
2005-06 to 2017-18 (ABS, multiple years), however, information was
not available on which farms received an infrastructure subsidy.
Challenges with ABS data included: it represented only a sample of
agricultural operations over a certain size; farm sizes varied over time
Fig. 1. Murray-Darling Basin in Australia. Source: Adapted from MDBA (2015).
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during non-census years; water extraction data was self-reported; and
the natural resource management region boundaries differed over time,
making direct region comparisons difficult. Nevertheless, ABS data in-
cluded an estimate of all water extractions on-farm (including
groundwater, floodplain harvesting, irrigation and private diversions).
The MDBA provides two water accounting estimates of MDB sur-
face-water extractions: (1) Cap data: water extraction data, available in
consistent form from 1997-98 to 2017-18, where water extractions
were referred to as ‘diversions’ (and Basin state compliance was re-
ported in the annual Water Audit Monitoring reports by the MDBA);
and (2) SDL accounting: ‘annual actual take’ (volume of water used for
consumptive purposes from watercourse or land-surface diversions),
currently available from 2012-13 to 2017-18 (e.g. includes Cap data
plus additional proxy estimates of surface-water extractions not mea-
sured under the Cap). The SDL water accounting and compliance fra-
mework was introduced in the MDB Plan 2012, and came into force on
1 July 2019. It is expected that, once all water resource plans are ac-
credited and enforced, the Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council
will recommend ending compliance against the Cap. Actual extractions
were the annual volume of water calculated under either the Cap or SDL
rules, which was actually used for consumptive (meaning not for en-
vironmental) purposes in a Cap valley or SDL resource unit (held en-
vironmental water entitlements are excluded) (MDBA, 2019a).
MDBA data includes surface-water extractions for metropolitan
Adelaide and country towns (MDBA, 2019a), but does not include
groundwater. MDBA (2019a) reported groundwater extractions as in-
creasing from 1223 GL in 2012–13 to 1627 GL in 2017–18 – the highest
level of extraction of any year within transitional groundwater SDL
accounts – however this is considered an underestimate, given in-
adequate measurement and monitoring (Holley et al., 2018;
Nelson, 2019). Appendix A outlines how the transitional SDL data is
still subject to considerable underestimation due to floodplain har-
vesting, other interceptions of stream-flows, lack of measurement of
stock and domestic extractions (i.e. basic rights), and also illegal ex-
tractions. Although 18 individual region audits have been triggered
since 1997-98 (MDBA 2019e), the only independent overall audit
conducted on Cap water extraction data since 2010 was a review by
Turner et al. (2019), which recommended the MDBA should consider
establishing a quality assurance process, as well as periodic in-
dependent audits. They also outlined 23 areas of concern (Turner et al.,
2019: see their Appendix G).
3.3. Primary on-farm survey data
The data used was from three representative University of Adelaide
irrigator farm surveys (2010-11; 2011-12; and 2015-16). These col-
lected information on irrigation water extractions and irrigation infra-
structure grant subsidies in the Southern Basin (see Zuo et al., 2015 and
Wheeler et al., 2018 for survey details). Our irrigator survey areas in
the Southern Basin (Fig. 1) included the Murray and Murrumbidgee
River regions (NSW), where mostly annual cotton and rice crops are
grown; the Goulburn–Murray Irrigation District and Murray River re-
gions (VIC) where mostly dairy and livestock production takes place;
and the Riverland (SA) where mostly citrus, wine grapes, fruit and nuts
are grown.
The irrigator surveys were representative, and had high response
rates. For example, the 2015-16 telephone-based survey had an initial
response rate of 51%, and a response rate of 73% including those who
agreed to be surveyed at a later date. Total cross-sectional sample size
across the three-year period was 2481 records, with 1830 records
having information on previous year water extractions in 2010-11 and
2015-16. In addition, some farmers were surveyed in all three years,
providing temporal data (see Appendix C). Not all questions were asked
in the 2011-12 survey, a follow-up to the 2010-11 survey. Water ex-
traction and farm income and production data was provided for the
previous season. The surveys included information on irrigators who
had received an infrastructure irrigation grant5, plus information on
their water entitlements (owned and traded), management behaviour,
water extractions by source, and other socio-economic demographics
and attitudes. The temporal dataset tracked water extraction for the
same irrigators over the five-year period, allowing the drivers of water
extractions to be investigated. Importantly, overall water extractions
varied significantly year by year, depending on seasonal conditions and
allocations (as illustrated in Fig. 2). Hence, our modelling attempted to
control for as many of these seasonal conditions as possible, as well as
controlling for individual farm and farmer characteristics. Table B1 in
Appendix B provides descriptive statistics.
Treatment effect estimators (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) were used
to determine the average treatment effect (ATE) of infrastructure grants on
water extractions and rates (see Appendix C for additional methodological
details). Estimating the causal influence of receiving a grant on water ex-
tractions from observational data was difficult due to potential for non-
random selection of irrigators between treatment and control groups. To
correct for this non-random selection, treatment effect estimators were
therefore used to estimate the causal effect – namely the mean of the dif-
ference between Y1 (water extraction for a grant recipient) and Y0 (water
extraction for the counterfactual) – the ATE (see Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009) for further methodological details).
4. Results
4.1. Secondary data results: ABS agricultural water extraction, MDBA Cap
and SDL water accounting data
Irrigation water extractions reflected climate variations; seasonal
water allocations to water entitlements; and land, crop, farm and irri-
gation characteristics (Fig. 2; Wheeler et al., 2015). In times of extended
drought, irrigated crop water needs increase but irrigators, typically,
have access to less water from storages, as water allocations assigned to
water entitlements decline, especially for lower reliability entitlements.
The two measures of MDBA water extraction data (SDL accounting of
‘actual take’ and Cap data ‘diversion’ as described in Section 3.2) were
plotted along with ABS farm water extraction data (Fig. 2). The three ex-
traction estimates followed very similar patterns, with ABS irrigation data
(as expected) estimating lower overall water extractions compared to the
MDBA's estimates for the total MDB. In the ABS data, MDB farm water
extractions varied considerably, but only decreased marginally from 2005-
06 to 2017-18; whereas the number of irrigated businesses fell over time,
but with no consequent trend in falling irrigation area or water extractions
per hectare (Table B3, Appendix B). The ABS data occasionally generated
higher estimates of water extractions in the Northern Basin, compared to
the MDBA data (Fig. B1, Appendix B). This was especially the case from
2012-13 onwards (notably after key changes to Northern Basin water-
sharing plans were made (AAS, 2019)).
Most (64%) of the environmental water entitlements owned by the
Australian Government were already held by the time the Basin Plan
was implemented in 2012 (Fig. 2). Taking 2017-18 as our reference for
a comparison against available MDBA and ABS data, the Australian
Government then owned just over 1900GL of entitlements in LTAAY
(e.g. representing around a 19% reduction in consumptive water ex-
tractions (MDBA, 2013, 2019a)).6 Here, we compared water extractions
5 Note, we did not collect specific information on what type of grant was
received, and our database therefore includes other possible irrigation infra-
structure subsidies other than Commonwealth subsidy programs.
6 The difficulty in calculating the percentage of water entitlements that have
been returned to the environment is choosing the inital year reference given a)
changing estimates of MDB baseline diversion limits (BDL) given water resource
plan changes; and b) whether to include urban/other interception water ex-
traction data in the BDL (MDBA, 2013). For example, the MDB BDL at 22 No-
vember 2012 was 13,623GL, and was 13,578GL at 29 March 2019. The SDL at
Basin Plan implementation was 10,873GL, while as at 29 March 2019 it was
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over two time-periods: 1997-98 to 2011-12 (i.e. the point at which the
majority of environmental entitlements were owned by the Common-
wealth) and 2012-13 to 2017-18 (both periods included wet and dry
years), using MDBA Cap data, to evaluate whether there had also been a
decline in water extractions of around one-fifth, as expected.
MDBA Cap diversion data indicated an average 2% reduction in
MDB surface-water diversions (with decreases in the Southern Basin
outweighing increases in the Northern Basin – see Appendix B) during
these two time-periods, although it should be noted that, as measured,
water extractions were currently within the Cap as at 2017-18
(MDBA, 2019a). Nevertheless, the measurement of water extractions is
contested (as outlined in Appendix A), as is the process of current water
accounting measurement. Slattery et al. (2019) observed that since
2010 there has been no independent audit to verify overall water ex-
traction figures – with Turner et al. (2019) providing the first overall
semi-audit. MDBA (2019e) reports that 18 individual audits on seven
Basin valleys have been triggered since 1997-98, with a number of
serious breaches found. ABS data (albeit over a shorter different time-
period and therefore, again, it is difficult to compare the two) also does
not show a 19% fall in irrigation water extraction. We suggest that
further ongoing auditing of all water extraction data (under either Cap
or SDL reporting) is required, along with a need for greater transpar-
ency regarding the water accounting method. However, future research
should analyse water extraction by valley, controlling for water allo-
cations, under different rainfall scenarios, carryover, and government
intervention – especially given the prevalence of the Millennium
drought during the above periods. Our broad findings identify im-
portant questions in relation to the change in irrigation water extrac-
tions.
4.2. Primary Data: Southern MDB irrigators’ water extractions and
utilisation rates
Our regression analysis, accounting for self-selection bias due to
observed covariates, identified that grant recipients had statistically
significant higher water extraction rates and volumes than non-re-
cipients. Table 1 provides the estimated ATE of grants for water ex-
traction volumes (ML) and rates (ML/ha) from five treatment effect
estimators, using ordinary least squares (OLS) as a benchmark for the
survey years in question. The ATE ranged from 0.34-0.38 ML/ha, de-
pending on the estimator used, and all are statistically significant
(p < 0.05). Therefore, this implies that overall, an irrigator who re-
ceived a grant extracted 0.34-0.38 ML per hectare more than an irri-
gator who did not receive a grant, everything else being equal. Re-
garding water extraction volumes, the ATE ranged from 0.19-0.25
Fig. 2. Annual MDBA Cap and SDL total MDB
water extractions, ABS irrigation water ex-
tractions and Commonwealth MDB environ-
mental entititlement ownership data. Sources:
MDBA (2019a) and ABS (multiple years). MDB
environmental entitlements are the long-term
average annual yield owned by the Australian
Government, it does not represent the use of
entitlements by environmental water holders.
Table 1
ATE of grants on water extraction rates and volumes.
Estimator Water extraction rates (ML/Ha) Water volumes (ML, natural log form)
Estimated ATE of grant p-value Estimated ATE of grant p-value
OLS 0.344 0.024 0.249 0.004
Treatment-effects: regression adjustment 0.349 0.022 0.248 0.004
Treatment-effects: augmented inverse-probability weights 0.350 0.023 0.232 0.008
Treatment-effects: inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment 0.351 0.023 0.232 0.008
Treatment-effects: nearest-neighbour matching 0.338 0.033 0.211 0.008
Treatment-effects: propensity-score matching 0.375 0.022 0.186 0.050
Note: Covariates used in the models listed in Appendix B, Table B1.
(footnote continued)
11,442GL (MDBA, 2019a). We followed MDBA (2013) and excluded urban/
other interception data and used the original BDL 2012 estimate to estimate a
19% reduction in consumptive use as at 2017-18. Using the current water re-
covery amount of 2100GL as at 31 March 2019, this represents a 21% reduction
in consumptive water extractions.
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(p< 0.05). Given that water volumes are in natural log transformation,
the ATE results imply that water extractions were 21-28% greater, on
average, for a subsidy recipient, compared to a non-recipient (see
Table 1) in our survey years.
We further analysed the water extractions data, using temporal data
(i.e tracking the same recipients and non-recipients from the first
survey in 2010-11 onwards, and obtained qualitatively similar results
(Table C1, Appendix C)).
4.3. Primary data: Southern MDB irrigators’ strategies
The full dataset was also investigated to understand whether the
behaviour of irrigators who received grants differed from those that did
not. In other words, what were grant recipients doing differently? First,
we found significantly different (and rising) water utilisation rates
(percentage of water received and used for irrigation7) by grant re-
cipients as compared to non-recipients during 2009-10 (62% for re-
cipients and 57% for non-recipients, t-stat = 1.99, df = 891, p-
value < 0.05) and 2014-15 (85% for recipients and 79% for non-re-
cipients, t-stat = 3.37, df = 919, p-value < 0.01) water seasons.
We also sought to understand the strategies that had been employed
by irrigators on the farm. Grant recipients were statistically more likely
to increase irrigated land, change crop mix, diversify production, and
increase purchase of permanent and temporary water in the previous
five years to the survey date (Tables 2 and 3). They were also more
likely to have sold their water entitlements than non-recipients, though
it is important to note that irrigators may have interpreted a ‘sale of
water entitlement’ as the transfer of a share of their water entitlements
to the Australian Government for the subsidy. The actual behaviour of
irrigators on their farms over the past five years is provided in Table 2,
and their planned strategies in the following five years from the survey
date is provided in Table 3.
Irrigators planned for more farm management activities than they
actually undertook (Table 3, see also Wheeler et al. (2013) for the
difference between actual and stated/planned behaviour). When irri-
gators originally planned a farm management strategy (i.e. increase/
decrease irrigated area, change crop mix, buy/sell water and buy/sell
farm land), this did not necessarily eventuate due to multiple reasons
(e.g. unplanned life/weather events, debt, health) (Wheeler et al.,
2013). Additional analysis (Table C2 in Appendix C) indicated that
receiving a grant increased the likelihood of irrigators expanding their
enterprises (i.e. increased irrigated area, buying farmland and water
entitlements), as well as changing their crop mix, compared to non-
grant recipients. Grant recipients were less likely to adhere to con-
tractive strategies, such as decreasing irrigated area and selling farm-
land, although these differences were not statistically significant. No
information was available in the surveys on groundwater substitution,
floodplain harvesting or illegal use.
In the 2015-16 survey irrigators were asked about water recovery
methods. On average, both grant and non-grant irrigators agreed that
water buybacks should be suspended, and that more money needed be
spent on on-farm irrigation infrastructure by the Commonwealth
(Australian Government) – while both groups disagreed on average that
more money should be spent on buybacks (Table 4). But, 28% of irri-
gators overall did agree (or were neutral) that more money should be
spent on water entitlement buybacks. In contrast, there was a sig-
nificant difference in attitudes found between the two groups, in terms
of their responses to whether irrigation infrastructure money had been
Table 2
Strategies of irrigators in the previous five years by grant status.
2010-11 2015-16
In the past five years, have you undertaken the following (% answering yes) Grant (n = 421) Non-granta (n = 525) Grant (n = 471) Non-grant (n = 529)
Purchased water entitlement 30.1⁎⁎⁎ 20.1⁎⁎⁎ 24.6⁎⁎⁎ 16.3⁎⁎⁎
Sold water entitlement 34 30.7 41.4⁎⁎⁎ 27.2⁎⁎⁎
Increased irrigated land area 15.7 13.3 31.8⁎⁎⁎ 23.1⁎⁎⁎
Decreased irrigated land area 44.7 45.5 20.2 22.9
Changed crop mix 53.2 51.6 57.7⁎⁎⁎ 41.8⁎⁎⁎
Purchased farm-land 21.6 21.5 30.6⁎⁎⁎ 22.9⁎⁎⁎
Sold farm-land 8.3 8.8 11.5 11.7
Improved irrigation efficiency 83.6⁎⁎⁎ 62.7⁎⁎⁎ 83.9⁎⁎⁎ 68.1⁎⁎⁎
Purchased water allocations N.A. N.A. 58.2⁎⁎ 51.4⁎⁎
Sold water allocations N.A. N.A. 50.3⁎⁎⁎ 40.0⁎⁎⁎
Diversified production 53 52 40.6⁎⁎ 33.5⁎⁎
Notes: ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, *Difference in strategy % between ‘grant’ and ‘non-grant’ is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance level, respectively. N.A.
indicates question not asked in survey.
Table 3
Planned strategies of irrigators in the next five years by grant status.
2010-11 2015-16
In the next five years, do you plan to undertake the following (% answering yes): Grant (n = 421) No grant (n = 525) Grant (n = 471) No grant (n = 529)
Purchase water entitlement 34.7 32.7 31.7 29.0
Sell water entitlement 37.8 36.8 14.3 15.2
Increase irrigated land 34.0 32.4 31.1 27.3
Decrease irrigated land 24.7 24.6 13.0* 16.9*
Change crop mix 59.4 61.9 54.7⁎⁎⁎ 42.1⁎⁎⁎
Purchase farm-land 32.5 30.5 34.9⁎⁎ 28.5⁎⁎
Sell farm-land 31.8 31.2 21.1 23.7
Note:⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, *Difference in strategy between ‘grant’ and ‘non-grant’ groups was statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance level, respectively.
7 Water utilisation rate represents the water extracted by irrigators as a per-
centage of the water allocated/received for a given year (which takes into ac-
count entitlement reliability). Mean water utilisation rate can be significantly
influenced by observations receiving little water from entitlements owned but
using much larger volumes through purchased water. Hence, water utilisation
rates for irrigators purchasing temporary water were capped to 100%, as they
used 100% of their own water entitlement use.
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wasteful and inefficient – irrigators who had not received any grants
were more likely to agree it had been wasteful. Similarly, the two
groups had significantly different views about whether irrigation in-
frastructure funds should have been spent on rural health and education
services instead (with non-grant recipients more likely to agree).
In summary, 51% of all irrigators surveyed agreed (or 75% agreed
or were neutral) that expenditure on irrigation infrastructure had been
wasteful and inefficient; while 21% of all irrigators agreed (or 54%
agreed or were neutral) that infrastructure subsidy money should have
been spent on rural education and health services instead.
5. Discussion
MDB irrigators have increasingly upgraded and modernized their
irrigation infrastructure over the past few decades (Meyer, 2005;
Crossman et al., 2010), using private funds and government subsidies.
Irrigation infrastructure upgrades are an incremental adoption for ir-
rigators (Wheeler et al., 2013) that allow farms to increase production
value-add. This change has been supported by the Australian Govern-
ment with subsidies for on-farm irrigation infrastructure intended to
deliver a ‘win’ for the environment (more water returned to the rivers)
and a ‘win’ for irrigated agriculture (increased value of agricultural
production) (DAWR, 2019a). However, government infrastructure ir-
rigation subsidies seem to have had a perverse water extraction out-
come and actually increased water extractions by recipients. Subsidies
reinforced, increased and hastened adoption of irrigation infrastructure
and methods that altered cropping patterns – encouraging irrigation of
permanent plantings, thereby increasing irrigated areas and on-farm
water extractions. Increased water extractions were made possible be-
cause of increased utilisation of all types of water entitlements8 and the
interception of overland flows, creeks and floodways (Steinfield and
Kingsford, 2013; Slattery et al., 2019). It is important to note that we
are not suggesting that our identification of a rebound effect of 21-28%
increase in water extractions has occurred at the Basin-level, as our
effect was identified with existing irrigators only (and does not include
those who have left the industry). What we are suggesting is that be-
cause of the rebound effect, and the considerable issues that have been
documented with governance, transparency, floodplain harvesting, re-
turn flows, substitution and illegal use, there is a real question re-
garding whether the actual reductions in irrigation water extractions
are the same as the amount of water returned to environmental use. The
limitations of our analysis include the fact that we only had access to a
couple of years of self-reported water extraction and infrastructure
subsidy data for irrigators still irrigating at our survey points in time in
the Southern Basin, and only a small sample size to conduct temporal
data analysis. Information was missing/incomplete on groundwater
substitution, illegal water use and floodplain harvesting. Further tem-
poral data analysis on a larger sample in the Northern and Southern
Basins would be warranted. In addition, further modelling on the dri-
vers of regional water extractions at the community level would also be
beneficial, along with the need for the ABS to geocode farm water ex-
traction at consistent boundaries and farm definitions over time in the
MDB.
To date, some AUD$4 billion has been spent on irrigation infra-
structure subsidies, and billions more expenditure on irrigation infra-
structure and supply projects is in the pipeiline - yet there exists a far
cheaper alternative to acquiring water for the environment: the direct
purchase of water entitlements from willing sellers via open tenders. Thus,
why is the idea of adopting (and subsidising) irrigation infrastructure to
save water so entrenched, not only in Australia but worldwide?
Perry (2018) explains it is because of entrenched views from eight groups:
farmers (it increases their on-farm income and saves inputs); engineers
(they benefit from (and like) money spent on modern infrastructure);
equipment suppliers (they sell the infrastructure); politicians (they can
claim they are saving the environment, solving food security and pleasing
constituents); planners (believe water is released to other urban or en-
vironmental uses); experts (they can recommend large schemes and make
optimistic predictions); donors (gives them something ‘concrete’ to fund
and easier to implement than policy reform); and environmentalists (be-
lieve water is released for the environment). The current call to ‘build
dams’ across Australia to solve its current water scarcity crisis emphasises
the simplistic and short-term mindset that unfortunately the debate often
falls into. Grafton and Williams (2019) also suggest that the irrigation
sector and its peak body groups have been highly successful at influencing
government decision-making.
Policy complacency also comes partly from a perception that cur-
rent technical tools adequately track water extraction and flows in
floodplain rivers. Governments primarily rely on mechanistic hydro-
logical models to understand the water balance. Existing hydrological
models used for auditing diversions can also perform poorly by over-
estimating low flows and under-estimating high flows on the flood-
plains – primarily because the data that they rely on originates from
gauges in the river channel (Ren and Kingsford, 2011) and the sig-
nificant complexity of natural hydrological and ecological interactions
(Appendix A). This is of greatest concern for the Northern Basin, where
irrigators are more likely to rely on both floodplain harvesting and
groundwater compared to the Southern Basin (Wheeler and
Garrick, 2020). Indeed, Turner et al. (2019) report a Cap data model
confidence indicator of ‘very low/low’ for Northern Basin valleys. Thus,
there is an urgent need to better understand historical and current
water extraction (using satellite measurement and thermal imagery,
along with metered data to track actual water extraction estimates), for
both surface-water and groundwater sources across all types of enti-
tlements; and to model changes in water extractions as the result of the
transfer of water entitlements across river valleys, holding all other
influences constant. These tools can support current modelling of flow
regimes. There is also a need for greater harmonisation/standardisation
of various water extraction data sources across river valleys.
As Holley et al. (2020) point out, resources for prosecutions, illegal
Table 4
Mean agreement score1 between irrigators who received grants and those that did not, with various attitudinal statements in 2015-16.
Attitudinal Statements Grant (n = 471) Non-grant (n = 529) p-value
Water buybacks for the Basin Plan should be suspended 3.89 3.95 0.45
More money should be spent on on-farm irrigation infrastructure by the Commonwealth 3.77 3.82 0.49
More money should be spent on water buybacks by the Commonwealth 2.05 1.95 0.19
Irrigation infrastructure money has been wasteful and inefficient 3.29 3.58 <0.01
I would rather irrigation infrastructure money was spent instead on rural health and education services 2.58 2.77 <0.01
Note: 1. Mean agreement score was simply the average of the Likert scale (where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree) of
recipients and non-recipients, respectively.
8 Increased utilisation of water entitlements and increased modernised irri-
gation will generally reduce return flows and also reduce dam storage levels. In
terms of growth in use impact on BDLs and SDLs, given the requirement that it
has to be ‘made good’, the probablility is that low-priority users may suffer
disproportionately in water allocations. Turner et al. (2019) note that the ‘make
good’ provisions have not been tested and it is a future key area to monitor.
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groundwater bores and stock and domestic water use have historically
received minimal attention. Although we recognise that substantial
improvements in compliance have recently occurred – such as an ap-
pointment of an interim Inspector General for the Basin (1 October
2019); the establishment of the NSW Natural Resources Access Reg-
ulator in 2017; and the increased use of some satellite monitoring of
water extractions – this increased scrutiny and institutional change has
only occurred after considerable external agitation and media exposure
(e.g. ABC Four Corners, 2019). There is a review of the Basin Plan,
including the level of water extractions, scheduled for 2026. While
there is some support for this schedule (e.g. see Vertessy et al., 2019),
our analysis suggests that a detailed and independent investigation is
required much sooner as to why water extractions are not falling, as
expected – and this without even considering the effects of climate
change (Colloff and Pittock, 2019).
Basin-wide environmental improvements do not seem to have oc-
curred and serious concerns exist about the impacts of 36 proposed
supply projects – intended to provide the same environmental benefits
with less water recovered for the environment, in terms of water enti-
tlements owned by the Australian Government (PC, 2018; Colloff and
Pittock, 2019). In our view, the evidence indicates that transforma-
tional rather than incremental change is required and the focus should
be on reducing (and effectively monitoring, enforcing and regulating)
water extraction. This transformational change will require a serious
reconsideration of how Australia shares its water, with greater em-
phasis given to ‘hands off’ water and minimum flows in rivers
(AAS, 2019; Young, 2019).
To date, water recovery for the environment, through irrigation
infrastructure subsidisation, has been used as a de facto rural devel-
opment strategy. Indeed, more than half of 1000 surveyed southern
Basin irrigators in 2015-16 believed that this expenditure was wasteful
and one-fifth of them believed it should have been spent on other ser-
vices in the community. It is time that economic and social develop-
ment in rural communities was taken more seriously (e.g. Wittwer and
Dixon, 2013), and proper rural economic development (and structural
and exit adjustment) strategies be developed (Wheeler et al., 2020).
This approach needs to integrate with appropriate climate change,
mental health, drought and natural resource management strategies, to
help create more resilient rural communities.
6. Conclusion
Our research suggests that subsidised irrigation infrastructure up-
grades in the MDB have not reduced water extractions or water con-
sumption at a Basin-scale. While Australia has returned one-fifth of
water entitlements in the MDB from extractive to environmental use,
this does not seem to have translated into commensurate reductions in
water extractions. This conclusion is based on comparisons of available
public data by MDBA and ABS at the Basin-scale, and the identified
existence of a rebound effect at the farm level. Indeed, our surveys of
2481 irrigators across a number of years indicate that those who
received an irrigation infrastructure grant increased their water ex-
traction volumes (by 21-28%) and rates, relative to other irrigators.
This increase occurred because of crop mix changes and increased ir-
rigated area, and was partly enabled through increased surface-water
entitlement utilisation and water trade participation. Our research
further suggests that current policy settings and compliance tools have
failed to adequately constrain water extractions at a Basin-scale due to:
(1) theft and poor enforcement in certain areas; (2) inaccurate and
missing metering and measurements (including in relation to poorly
regulated groundwater substitution); (3) growth in unlicensed diver-
sions and on-farm storage capacity (notably in relation to floodplain
harvesting); (4) legal exceptions and uncertainties in compliance tools
and processes; and (5) complexities of natural hydrological and ecolo-
gical interactions on floodplains, particularly in relation to evaporative
processes and interactions between surface-water and groundwater
systems. These problems are greatest in the less-regulated Northern
Basin.
Our findings highlight the behavioural implications that arise from
subsidising irrigation infrastructure. This requires reform that facil-
itates the use of technology to generate robust, fully audited water
accounts, underpinned by sound measurement of all inflows; water
consumption; recoverable return flows; and flows to sinks. Further,
uncertainties should be appropriately accounted for in key water
parameters such as: 1) improved compliance at the licence-holder and
catchment scale (including close monitoring of, and response to,
growth-in-use; independent and properly resourced enforcement
agencies; and providing for third party enforcement of the Water Act
and MDB Plan); and 2) using multiple lines of evidence for accounting
and compliance. Finally, there needs to be a prioritisation of cost-ef-
fectiveness and environmental effectiveness for water recovery.
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Appendix A
This appendix explores different factors driving increased water extractions (exceeding the MDB Cap and in many cases also the SDLs water
accounting frameworks) in certain catchments across the MDB. These are: theft of both surface and groundwater resources and poor enforcement;
inaccurate or absent measurement of water diversions (Matthews, 2017; MDBA, 2017; NSW Ombudsman, 2017; Holley et al., 2018, 2020;
Nelson, 2019); unlicensed diversions (in particular floodplain harvesting, interception activities and basic rights) (MDBA, 2019a); growth in on-farm
storage capacity in floodplain zones (AAS, 2019); legal exceptions, inadequate governance assessment of extractions from the main channels of
rivers, and uncertainties in SDL compliance tools and processes (MDBA, 2018); and natural complexities of floodplain, evaporation and groundwater
interactions (Ward, 1999; Parsons et al., 2008). Furthermore, Turner et al. (2019; see their Appendix G) outlined 23 areas of concern with SDL
accounting. Of these areas, they considered the following to be of greatest concern (in terms of being rated high in materiality and impact):
floodplain harvesting; unauthorised extraction; climate change; preparation for growth-in-use responses; and cultural flows.
Theft of both surface and groundwater resources and poor enforcement; inaccurate or absent measurement of water diversions
As water theft, poor enforcement and inaccurate or absent measurement of diversions are inextricably linked, we address these matters con-
currently with an emphasis on two Basin States – NSW and Queensland. The choice of these States is based on evidence that they are “…bedevilled
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by patchy metering, the challenges of measuring unmetered take and the lack of real-time, accurate water accounts,” affecting compliance and
enforcement (MDBA, 2017; 14). It is also based on alleged and proven non-compliance with water laws in north-western NSW and the QLD MDB. By
way of background, allegations of water theft first came to light via a series of media exposés in 2017 and 2018. This led to numerous formal
inquiries, reviews and reports (inquiries) into alleged water theft, misconduct by bureaucrats and maladministration of water laws. These inquiries
found, inter alia, inadequate enforcement of relevant laws by water agencies within these two States (Matthews, 2017; MDBA 2017;
NSW Ombudsman, 2017).
NSW has taken steps to remedy this lacuna, establishing the Natural Resources Access Regulator (NRAR) by an Act of Parliament in November
2017 (Holley et al., 2020). The NRAR began operating in April 2018 and at the time of writing, has taken a significant number of enforcement
actions (including nine prosecutions, 50 penalty infringement notices and 107 statutory notices) (NRAR Report, 2019). While this reflects well on the
NRAR, it also highlights issues with compliance (including water theft, as reflected in a number of prosecutions). While the extent of water theft is
unclear (due to lack of publicly available data), the NSW General Purpose Water Accounting Reports classify substantial volumes of water as ‘un-
accounted differences’ in a number of catchments for several accounting years (e.g. Burrell et al., 2018). Although most of this difference is probably
associated with modelling issues, some of these unexplained ‘losses’ could be attributed to theft – particularly in valleys with historically low and/or
inaccurate metering (such as the Northern MDB) (MDBA, 2017; 137), requiring further investigation. Metering and telemetry are slated to be rolled
out across NSW between now and 2023 (MDBA, 2019b) which, if successfully implemented and maintained, will arguably improve compliance with
water laws (assuming the NRAR continues to be properly funded to enforce these laws).9 However, metering and telemetry will not be universal, and
in particular are not legally required for thousands of bores located across the State (MDBA, 2019b).
Queensland also has a poor enforcement record, as well as the large percentage of diversions (over two-thirds) that are unmetered or otherwise
unmeasured (MDBA, 2017). This leaves considerable scope for unauthorised diversions, particularly given the large volumes of unmeasured water
that are taken from floodplains, low levels of telemetry and the widespread practise of self-reading meters (MDBA, 2017). While water accounting
reports for each catchment in Queensland are not publicly available, Water Auditing Monitoring Reports, which continued to 2011-12 (detailing
compliance by each Basin State with the Cap), indicate that diversion figures for Queensland are the least accurate of any Basin State (MDBA, 2016).
While the Queensland Government has announced plans to improve measurement of water diversions, it remains to be seen what percentage of
extractions will be accurately measured and subject to telemetry, particularly given the large volumes of diversions attributable to floodplain
harvesting. It also remains to be seen whether the government will meet its stated commitment to ensure all water entitlements in the Queensland
MDB are accurately metered by 202510 (noting that not all legal extractions are linked to an entitlement). Further, the ability of floodplain
earthworks to divert water is poorly identified and not measured. It is also unclear whether these proposed improvements will translate into
enforcement of water laws and reductions in possible non-compliance.
Groundwater diversions merit particular attention because the monitoring of groundwater extraction in the MDB remains weak (Holley et al.,
2018, 2020; Nelson, 2019). Of the approximately 270,000 bores in the Bureau of Meteorology's (BOM) groundwater dataset within the MDB surface-
water area, 99,436 are in the NSW MDB and 34,548 in the QLD MDB. Of these, 13,180 are for irrigation, 22,444 are for stock and domestic use and
38,744 are used for unknown purposes (with the remainder attributed to a variety of purposes including monitoring, industrial use and water
supply).11 While this dataset does not exclude bores extracting water from aquifers in the Great Artesian Basin (which underlays the top third of the
MDB), it is still reasonable to conclude that the number of bores extracting water for consumptive purposes from the NSW and QLD MDB
groundwater sources is in the thousands. Relevantly, in the NSW MDB, many categories of bores are not required by law to be metered (for example
those used for stock and domestic purposes) and all are exempt from the telemetry provisions that were introduced in 2018.12 Similarly, in the
Queensland MDB, diversions from most groundwater sources are not metered.13 Further, a 2019 review by the MDBA into the self-meter read
process, applicable to the Condamine Alluvium Groundwater Source, found that “the control environment is insufficient to provide adequate
assurance that the measurement and reporting of water take in the Condamine Alluvium is reliable” (MDBA, 2019c; 2).
Uncertainty regarding extractions from groundwater sources is of particular concern during times of reduced surface-water availability/allo-
cations (Nelson, 2019). According to the BOM, “[d]rought can cause groundwater use to increase as surfacewater becomes scarce and allocations are
reduced…” The BOM noted: “…this appeared to occur in the upper and lower Namoi catchment, in 2017–18, with licenced extractions using
200,049 ML of groundwater from aquifers. This was almost the full allowable take of 203,800 ML. This number does not include unlicensed
extractions for stock watering or domestic purposes.” (BOM, 2019; 20). The final point is of broad significance: stock and domestic extractions in
NSW and QLD are neither metered nor strictly controlled by a volumetric limit, adding an additional layer of uncertainty regarding the overall
volume extracted from both surface and groundwater for this purpose (Nelson, 2019). The combination of probable reductions in surface-water
availability in the MDB due to climate change (MDBA, 2019d) and the likely, subsequent shift to diversions – both legal and illegal – from poorly
regulated groundwater sources (Nelson, 2019) may result in unaccounted SDLs exceedence. This hypothesis is linked to our analysis of the adequacy
of SDL compliance tools and processes, detailed further below.
Unlicensed diversions (in particular floodplain harvesting, interception activities and basic rights) and growth in on-farm storage capacity in
floodplain zones
Floodplain harvesting in the Northern MDB is inadequately regulated and measured, giving rise to a high level of uncertainty regarding volumes
extracted in this manner (MDBA, 2017; AAS, 2019; Walker, 2019). In NSW, it remains an unlicenced form of water extraction which is estimated
using hydrological modelling (NSW DPI, 2013). In QLD, it is either licenced or subject to a more general authorisation.14 As in NSW, extractions are
estimated using modelling, which is in part based on potentially out-of-date data regarding private off-river storage capacity (AAS, 2019) (noting
that storage meters are only used in one sub-catchment) (Queensland Government, 2019). There is also evidence that laws regulating the building of
levees and storages in both states have been poorly enforced, which combined with other factors has led to an overall growth in development in
certain catchments (Kingsford 1999; Steinfield and Kingsford, 2013; AAS, 2019; Walker, 2019). The net effect is a low level of confidence that these
9Water Management (General) Regulation 2018 (NSW), Part 10; s. 231(1); Schedule 8(6); s. 231(1)(c)(d).
10 Murray-Darling Compliance Compact (2018); 6. https://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/files/Basin-Compliance-Compact-180702-D18-31184.pdf.
11 Data provided by the Bureau of Meteorology (by email), 16 September 2019.
12 Water Management (General) Regulation 2018 (NSW), s. 231(1)(d); Schedule 8(6)(2)(b).
13 Water Act 2000 (QLD); Water Regulation 2016 (QLD).
14 Water Act 2000 (QLD), s. 101.
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extractions are in all instances capable of being contained by statutory limits or compliant with the Cap.
Both NSW and Queensland intend to improve the management and measurement of floodplain harvesting (NSW DPI, 2013; Queensland
Government, 2019; 23). Specifically, NSW is proposing to licence floodplain harvesting in five Northern Basin catchments by 2021,15 with hy-
drological modelling being used to determine the volume attributed to each licence. However, an independent review of the modeling found that “…
there is a lack of transparency in the steps undertaken to develop the numerical models used in the implementation process, largely because of a lack
of coherent, complete and up to date documentation outlining the methodologies, calibration, verification and assessment of scenarios” (Weber and
Claydon, 2019; 5). Thus, the overall intent of the policy, which is to reduce floodplain harvesting to an historic level of extractions (most commonly
that which was diverted in 1999-2000) (AAS, 2019), is potentially being undermined by technical and methodological flaws. Uncertainty regarding
historic and current levels of floodplain harvesting is compounded by a lack of clarity regarding the fate of levees capable of diverting water beyond
licenced volumes. That is, it is unclear whether all such structures will be permanently decommissioned and, if not, how this will be managed in light
of volumetric limits. In Queensland, the government has made a very general commitment to improve measurement of these diversions16, however
details have not yet been made available. In summary, important questions remain regarding volumes attributable to floodplain harvesting, and
whether or not they can be contained within SDLs.
Legal exceptions, inaccurate data, water accounting and inadequate governance arrangements
SDL compliance provisions and processes merit particular attention. First, the Basin Plan allows for the cumulative exceedance of the permitted
take since 30 June 2019 – to reach a trigger equal to 20% of the long-term average annual volume of the SDL for a catchment, before a Basin State is
required to provide a “reasonable excuse” for the exceedance. Where a reasonable excuse is provided, the State will be deemed compliant. Further,
where the exceedence is found to be beyond the Basin State's control, the excess will be removed from the accounting record17. In other words, non-
compliance will only occur when an exceedence in excess of the 20% trigger is not accompanied by a “reasonable excuse” (which is not defined in
the Water Act or Plan, although policy guidance regarding this matter is available (MDBA, 2018)). In such instances, the MDBA is entitled to take
enforcement action under Part 8 of theWater Act 2007 (seeking, for example, an injunction preventing an ongoing breach of the SDL for a particular
water resource plan area). However, it has indicated that it would seek to avoid the courts to the extent possible, relying instead on diplomatic
pathways (including a range of possible management actions) and the use of its auditing functions18. Further, as theWater Act does not include open
standing provisions, third parties (including those directly affected by water management decisions) are not entitled to enforce the Act or Plan
through the courts.
It is understood that the 20% “exception”, previously in place under the MDB Cap, was included in the Basin Plan to reduce the probability of a
catchment being declared in breach of annual permitted extractions on the basis of inaccurate hydrological modelling. Further, and according to the
MDBA (2018; 4), “…regardless of whether a Basin state is determined to be non-compliant or compliant with a reasonable excuse, if an excess
growth-in-use is identified, the Basin state will be required to ‘make good’ and reduce actual take to the SDL”. However, this is a policy position
rather than an explicitly stipulated legal requirement19 and one that depends on successful identification of growth-in-use, which can be “difficult to
quantify” (Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, 2017; 58) – particularly given the issues with measurement of water and associated hydro-
logical modelling in certain parts of the Basin, as discussed below. It also depends on the cooperation of any affected Basin States to reduce
allocations. Given the frequent and well-documented threats by the current NSW Government to “walk away” from the Basin Plan if its demands to
maintain or increase the volume of water available for consumptive use are not met (NSW DPIE, 2019), this cannot be assumed.
Second, the method for determining compliance with SDLs (via an assessment of annual actual take and annual permitted take), set out in each
water resource plan20, may be based on modelling that draws upon inaccurate datasets. For example, approximately 20% of extractions in the MDB
are unmeasured (MDBA, 2018) – thereby rendering assumptions regarding these diversions inherently unreliable, complicating assessment of SDL
compliance. Indeed, the MDBA has identified “issues with the accuracy of hydrologic models used for SDL compliance”, with confidence levels
(which reflect error rate) for models for Northern Basin catchments rated as “low” or “very low” (Turner et al., 2019). This general conclusion can be
usefully supported by a more specific case study. To that end, we have analysed the Water Accounting Methods Report for the Condamine-Balonne
Water Resource Plan (Queensland Government, 2019), relevant only to the Queensland section of this catchment, and identified major factors
capable of undermining the accuracy of SDL compliance assessment for that water resource plan area. These factors are evidenced by the manner in
which the long-term annual average extractions across different categories in the Condamine-Balonne are estimated. In the first instance, 398.07GL
out of a total of 870.6GL of take is not measured. Second, few water allocations are measured with meters that comply with Australian Standard 4747
(0% of supplemented water allocations (which total 106.97GL) and 1% of unsupplemented water allocations (which total 326.99GL)) (Queensland
Government, 2019; 18). Third, estimation of overland flow-extractions is modelled, with this being partly based on survey data regarding the
capacity of overland flow storages that is approximately 20 years old (Queensland Government, 2019; 24). While a moratorium was imposed on the
construction of new storage works in the Condamine-Balonne in 2000, compliance cannot be assumed over the last two decades. In summary, data
regarding at least half of all known extractions in the area is likely to be more or less unreliable due to absent or inaccurate measurement. This is
significant insofar as the calculation of annual actual extractions for the three aforementioned categories is based on the same method as that which
was used to determine long-term annual average take (although we do note that additional lines of evidence are used to determine annual actual take
for overland flow diversions) (Queensland Government, 2019; 44). There is, therefore, an extremely high probability that estimations of actual
extractions for these categories are not accurate. We can also conclude that the modelling used to assess SDL compliance (annual permitted take) is in
part based on data that is either unmeasured or inaccurately measured. Hence, there is reason to question the accuracy of SDL compliance processes
for this water resource plan area, undermining compliance with the applicable SDL.
Water accounting issues also demand attention. Given that water entitlements across the MDB comprise varying securities and rights, they are
often converted to LTAAY figures using LTDLE or cap factors. There are currently a number of LTDLE versions, namely 1) a version used in the Living
15 https://www.industry.nsw.gov.au/water/plans-programs/healthy-floodplains-project/harvesting (accessed 25.09.19).
16 https://www.dnrme.qld.gov.au/land-water/initiatives/rural-water-management/projects/measurement-overland-flow (accessed 25.09.19).
17 Basin Plan, s. 6.11(5), s. 6.12; 6.12C.
18 Basin Plan, s. 13.10, and notes under s. 6.12(5) and s. 6.12C(5). See also the non-compliance ‘escalation pathway’ set out in: MDBA (2018b; 13).
19 Under s. 71(1)(h) of the Water Act 2007 (Cth), the MDBA can require that a Basin state provide it with information regarding the actions that it proposes to take
to ensure that SDLs are complied with in the future. However, this provision is discretionary.
20 Basin Plan, ss. 10.10; 10.15.
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Murray, which was subsequently applied in the Water for the Future program from 2007-08 onwards; 2) a version used by the MDBA to develop the
baseline diversion limits in the Basin Plan, first applied by the Commonwealth government in 2011 (and which had the impact of reducing the
amount of water recovered, causing the Ministerial Council to order that the Authority revert to the original LTDLEs) (Slattery and Campbell 2018);
and 3) a current version being developed for the purposes of water resource plans (PC, 2018; AAS, 2019). Shifting between LTDLE versions is
significant insofar as it changes the LTAAY of water entitlements , therefore potentially increasing or decreasing the need for water recovery. The
PC (2018) provides an n actual example for the changes in water accounting in the Gwydir. Specifically, changes in cap factors for supplementary
and general security licences mean that the current estimate of CEWH holdings in that valley have increased from a LTAAY holding of 40,623GL to
47,932GL (without buying or selling any water). AAS (2019) has suggested that the change in cap factors in the latest version of the LTDLE was
considerably different to previous estimates of LTAAY by the MDBA; it has further suggested that this version requires urgent reassessment as it could
be used to reclassify some resource units as over-recovered against relevant SDLs.
Finally, current technical tools such as mechanistic hydrological models, focusing primarily on the main channels of rivers, do not adequately
track water extraction and flows in floodplain rivers. Existing hydrological models used for auditing diversions can over-estimate low flows and
under-estimate high flows on the floodplains as the data they rely on is primarily derived from gauges in the river channel (Ren and
Kingsford, 2011). Modelling concerns were also raised in the SA MDB Royal Commission. For example, Close (2018) noted that on-farm storage in
the Barwon-Darling increased by 50% between 1993-94 and 2000, with the region in breach of the Cap only three years after its introduction.
However, the 2013 model that was developed by Bewsher (2013) for the MDBA under the Northern Basin review found that the Barwon-Darling was
no longer in breach. This finding was not accompanied by any explanation, which was perplexing given the aforementioned increases in devel-
opment. Despite experts recommending that the model not be accredited for Cap compliance purposes, it was used as part of the Northern Basin
Review (Close, 2018).
In summary, there is considerable evidence to suggest that, where water extractions are not measured or are inaccurately measured (which is
particularly relevant in the Northern Basin), SDL compliance tools may underestimate extractions and in turn fail to properly identify breaches of the
Cap or the SDL under all forms of water accounting.
Natural complexities of floodplains, evaporation processes and groundwater systems
Finally, there is considerable natural complexity in the hydrological and ecological behaviour of floodplains, including in relation to evaporation
and surface-water - groundwater interactions (Ward, 1999; Parsons et al., 2008). For example, there is evidence that in the lower valleys of the MDB,
groundwater bores that are located next to rivers may at times allow for the extraction of surface flows due to the high level of connectivity between
sources (Braaten and Gates, 2003). Further, the building of strutures on floodplains allows for diversion of floodplain flows into private storages
(Steinfield and Kingsford, 2013; Steinfield et al., 2013). This complexity is not currently adequately captured in water accounting models or for
compliance purposes, with relatively limited use of satellite imagery to track flows across the floodplains of the MDB. In summary, these issues
generate further uncertainty regarding actual water extractions.
Appendix B
Table B2 illustrates our classification of ABS farm water extraction data into consistent areas to allow comparison of Northern and Southern
Basins over time. Water extractions on farms is based on gross application rates and is not ‘net use’, but does not include diversion losses associated
with transporting water to farms. From 2015-16 onwards, water extractions were estimated from farm busineseses undertaking agricultural activity
above a minimum threshold of the estimated value of their agricultural operations (AUD$40,000). Agricultural census level data was available for
2005-06; 2010-11; and 2015-16. Before 2015-16, the ABS used an estimated agricultural value of AUD$5000 (ABS, 2019). The impact of this change
was that from 2015-16 onwards, irrigation business numbers are estimated to be reduced by 22%, and water volumes by 4%. Thus, ABS water
Table B1
Descriptive statistics of variables in regression analysis, 2010-11 and 2015-16.
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Water extraction rate (ML/irrigation ha) 4.51 3.34 0.0001 19.77
Water extraction annual volume (ML) 616.81 1682.94 0.1 45000
Age (years) 57.10 11.28 24 90
Male dummy (1 = male; 0 = otherwise) 0.88 0.32 0 1
Low education level dummy (1 = education below year 10; 0 = otherwise) 0.17 0.37 0 1
Farming years 35.94 13.53 1 80
Whole farm plan dummy (1 = plan; 0 = otherwise) 0.74 0.44 0 1
Horticulture industry dummy (1 = horticulture; 0 = otherwise) 0.34 0.47 0 1
Broadacre industry dummy (1 = broadacre; 0 = otherwise) 0.30 0.46 0 1
Dairy/livestock industry dummy (1 = dairy; 0 = otherwise) 0.36 0.48 0 1
Farm size (ha) 677.42 2171.12 0.40 36826.43
Number of full-time equivalent employees 2.30 2.45 0 40
Irrigation area (ha) 198.83 435.41 0.40 8000
Productivity level1 2.72 1.31 1 5
Debt equity ratio 0.36 0.43 0 7
Attitude towards technology2 4.18 0.82 1 5
Net farm income at AUD 2015 prices ($)3 63679.61 71498.06 03 250000
Total high security water entitlements (ML) 267.40 495.89 0 9604
Total general/low security water entitlements (ML) 532.49 1505.86 0 48000
Percentage of income from off-farm work (%) 31.87 35.49 0 100
Year dummy (1 = year 2015; 0 otherwise) 0.56 0.50 0 1
1 Self-rating of productive output of farm over the last five years on a scale where 1 = strongly decreasing and 5 = strongly increasing.
2 A Likert scale variable from 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree for the statement ‘Knowing about technology is
important to me’.
3 All negative net farm income was coded as zero net farm income.
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Table B2
Natural resource management (NRM) region classification in the Northern and Southern Basin.
NRM region 2005-06 to 2012-13 2013-14 to 2015-16 2016-17 to 2017-18 Note
Western Northern Northern Northern NRM boundary changed 2016-17





Lower Murray-Darling Northern Data not reported
Central Tablelands Northern NRM existed since 2016-17
Central West Northern
North West NSW Northern
Northern Tablelands Northern
Riverina Southern
South East NSW Southern
Table B3
MDB farm irrigation water extractions in ABS data.







Volume applied – including farm irrigation surface,
groundwater & floodplain (ML)
Extraction rate (ML/
irrigated ha)
2005-06 61,504 18,674 1,664,000 7,397,678 4.45
2006-07 59,864 17,063 1,101,000 4,458,279 4.05
2007-08 56,585 15,875 957,753 3,141,659 3.28
2008-09 54,096 15,476 929,074 3,492,409 3.76
2009-10 53,681 15,486 975,660 3,564,480 3.65
2010-11 54,023 15,794 1,194,253 4,518,369 3.78
2011-12 53,946 14,684 1,411,612 5,875,449 4.16
2012-13 51,203 13,361 1,597,454 8,283,439 5.19
2013-14 50,929 14,496 1,559,565 7,736,385 4.96
2014-15 49,096 14,587 1,366,738 5,868,785 4.29
2015-16 35,465 9216 1,238,106 4,938,381 3.99
2016-17 36,083 9196 1,347,592 6,355,072 4.72
2017-18 35,203 9496 1,460,054 6,797,678 4.66
Fig. B1. MDBA Cap diversion data and ABS water extraction data for the Southern (SMDB) and Northern (NMDB) MDB. Sources: MDBA (2019a) and ABS (multiple years).
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volumes and extraction rates from 2015-16 onwards should have been higher in Table B3 and Figs. B1 and Fig. 2 – if following the same method
definitions as used prior to 2015-16.
Also, due to changes in Natural Resource Management boundaries, it was not possible to have Northern and Southern Basin areas align exactly
with standard Basin boundaries used by the MDBA. In order to have Northern and Southern Basin boundaries derived from NRM areas as consistently
as possible over the whole period shown here, the Lower Darling is included in the Northern Basin from 2005-06 to 2012-13 (although technically it
should be in the Southern Basin). From 2013-14 to 2015-16, the Lower Darling was not reported by the ABS. From 2016-17 to 2017-18, the Western
NRM area in the Northern Basin includes the Lower Darling. In addition, the Western, Central West and Central Tablelands in NSW are all in the
Northern Basin, and since 2016-17, have included a part of Lachlan (Southern Basin).
Appendix C
C1. Regression methodology
Water extraction rate was used to illustrate the treatment effect estimator below, but this method was also applied to model total water ex-
tractions as well. The only difference was that total water extraction was tranformed by natural logarithm given its large dispersion (whereas the
water extraction rate did not have such a large dispersion). Rescaling by taking a natural logrithm resulted in a difference of water extraction in
percentge terms between grant recipients and non-recipients. Consider an irrigator that did not receive a grant has a water extraction rate Y0. Y1 is
defined as the potential water extraction rate or counterfactual for the same irrigator if he/she received a grant. For an irrigator that did receive a
grant, Y1 is observed, so Y0 would be the counterfactual outcome for the same irrigator. A missing-data problem arises since both Y1 and Y0 cannot be
observed simultaneously for the same irrigator. Treatment-effect methods can account for this and estimate the ATE – the mean of the difference (Y1-
Y0). Given receiving a grant is not likely to be random, recipient status could be related to covariates that also affect water extraction (i.e. a potential
self-selection bias). Hence, the difference in sample means does not estimate the true average treatment effect. The treatment effects estimator
specifies a number of covariates so that any remaining influences on the treatment are not related to the potential outcome, namely the water
extraction rate.
Assume xi is a vector of observed covariates that affect the outcome (water extraction rate), and wi is a vector of covariates that affect the
treatment assignment – receiving a grant (xi and wi may have elements in common) – the functional forms for Y0 and Y1 are:
= +Y x0 0 0
= +Y x1 1 1
where β0 and β1 are coefficients to be estimated and ε0 and ε1 are error terms that are not related to xi or wi. The treatment assignment is:




γ is a coefficient vector and ω is an error term that is not related to either xi or wi. Estimates of these coefficient vectors can be used to estimate the
ATE=E(Y1-Y0). There are several different estimators to accomplish this, including regression adjustment (RA), augmented inverse-probability
weights (AIPW), inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA), propensity-score matching (PSM) and nearest-neighbour matching
(NNM) (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). It should be noted that there is no definitive way to select one estimator over the others. However, the AIPW
and IPWRA estimators have a double-robust property that if either the outcome model or the treatment model is correctly specified, the ATE can be
consistently estimated. Similar ATE estimates across the various estimators is a necessary condition that the models are correctly specified (note
Table 1 shows very similar ATE estimates).
We removed outliers where values >20 ML/ha were excluded, and also controlled for sample selection bias. The choice of independent variables
(e.g. xi and wi) in the model were driven by past research findings (e.g. Wheeler et al., 2014a, 2015), including age, gender, education, farming
experience, agricultural industry, farm size, number of employed farm workers, irrigation area size, farm productivity condition, water right
ownership, net farm income and off-farm work. Given the above, as well as missing covariate responses, the final sample size was 1604. Serious
multicollinearity was tested for via correlations and variance inflation factors, with no serious issues identified. Robust standard errors were used to
mitigate heteroskedasticity. In addition to accounting for the observed covariates, receiving a grant was tested for endogeneity to account for
unobserved variables influencing both receiving a grant and water extraction rate/volumes, using an additional exclusion restriction – a Likert scale
variable from strongly disagree to strongly agree for the statement ‘Knowing about technology is important to me’. A test for endogeneity (chi-2
statistic = 1.98, df = 2, p-value = 0.37 for water extraction rate; and chi-2 statistic = 1.63, df = 2, p-value = 0.44 for water extraction volumes)
indicated the treatment and outcome unobservables are uncorrelated – hence receiving a grant was not endogenous to the water extraction rate.
C2. Analysis using the same irrigators over time (panel dataset)
To track water extractions over our time, we followed the same grant recipients and non-recipients from the first survey in 2010-11, for their
observations in 2011-12 (535 records) and 2015-16 (338 records) (Table C1). This tracks what happened to their water extraction over time (one and
five years after our initial survey and by grant status as at 2010-11).21
Trends for all groups of irrigators’ water extraction in the panel analysis rates mirrors the cross-sectional results reported in the body of the paper
(namely recipients have higher absolute extraction rates and are increasing their extraction at a faster rate). But, the difference in water extraction
rates between recipients and non-recipients is not significant for any particular industry (Table C1). Hence although grant recipients, as of 2010-11,
had a relatively larger water extraction rate, it was not statistically significantly different than non-recipients, either one or five years later. This
21 59 of the non-recipient group originally surveyed in 2010-11 indicated they received a grant in 2015-16, implying they may have received their first infra-
structure grant anytime between 2010-11 and 2015-16. Therefore, these 59 were excluded from the 2015-16 calculation. However, sensitivity tests indicated that
results did not significantly differ when included.
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finding is potentially driven by the smaller sample size in the panel dataset than the cross-sectional analysis. Nevertheless, the change in the water
extraction rate between 2011-12 and 2015-16 was largest for the grant recipient group, and especially for horticulture and broadacre industries. For
the dairy/livestock industry, the change was smaller for the recipient group.
Table C2 shows that using the panel dataset suggested that receiving a grant increased the likelihood of irrigators expanding their enterprises (i.e.
increased irrigated area, buying farmland and water entitlements) as well as changing crop mix, compared to non-grant recipients.
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